Este trabalho discute as possíveis relações entre a histeria e os chamados distúrbios alimentares que, na atualidade, ganharam um caráter epidêmico. Os discursos dos autores sobre a anorexia e a bulimia são apresentados e organizados em categorias temáticas que abordam as definições de anorexia e bu..

El presente artículo tiene por intención principal dilucidar las distinciones y relaciones conceptuales que existen entre labor, trabajo y ocio, en el pensamiento de Hannah Arendt y Walter Benjamin, a modo de esclarecer cómo los posicionamientos de ambos autores contribuyen a la crítica de la concepción del trabajo moderno. Para ello, será necesario exponer los matices conceptuales de la obra de Arendt, a saber, la distinción entre trabajo y labor, con el fin de trazar las diferencias y puntos de encuentro (...) con las reflexiones de Benjamin en torno a los cambios traídos como consecuencia del auge del capitalismo industrial y en la experiencia del ocio. Entre estos matices, esclarecimientos y contrastes, es preciso no solo destacar la importancia de la relación e influencia de ambos autores, sino su vigencia en las problemáticas sociales contemporáneas al respecto. (shrink)

In this article we establish that in mythical thought there is, as a natural quality, an expression of universality. Following Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, we show that through the expressive function of myth it is possible to develop an expressive way of thinking or a pre-logical type of knowledge. We then propose an interpretation of Oedipus at Colonus in order to show that it offers a plausible resource to relate the individual and the community, and that the framework in (...) this tragedy works as a complex sign and symbolic path to delineate a form of expressive relationship through which it is possible to propose the unification of the individual with the community. (shrink)

Investigadores pertenecientes a la tradición de la psicología del desarrollo cognitivo han llevado a cabo estudios que sugieren que existe un vínculo entre la percepción de daño y el dominio moral. Frente a esta propuesta unificadora del dominio moral han surgido críticas desde la psicología cultural. Haidt publicó en 1993 uno de los estudios más influyentes en esta línea, afirmando haber encontrado evidencia que sugiere la existencia de dominios morales no vinculados a la noción de daño. En este artículo se (...) hará una presentación general del debate en torno al contenido del dominio moral. Luego presentaremos y evaluaremos el estudio de Haidt et al.. Por último, presentamos resultados experimentales que cuestionan las conclusiones de ese estudio y sugieren que el debate sigue abierto. Researchers belonging to the tradition of cognitive-developmental psychology have suggested studies that the perception of harm is central to the Moral Domain. This unifying proposal of the Moral Domain has provoked the criticisms of researchers working in Cultural Psychology. Haidt published in 1993 a very influential study, claiming to have found evidence for the existence of Moral Domains not linked to the notion of harm. In this paper, we briefly present the debate around the content of the moral domain. We then critically examine the study by Haidt et al.. Finally, we present experimental results that question the conclusions of their study and suggest that the debate is still open. (shrink)

Resumen: Entre el pensamiento de José Gaos y el de Eduardo Nicol se cierne una diferencia sustancial en torno al concepto de la filosofía. Para el primero, ésta es una suerte de confesión personal; mientras que para Nicol la filosofía debe ser producto de una hazaña dialógica y el conocimiento tiene que ser objetivo.: José Gaos’s and Eduardo Nicol’s concepts of philosophy differ substantially. For the former, philosophy is a sort of personal confession, whereas for the later it must be (...) the outcome of dialogical achievement, and as for knowledge, this has to be objective. (shrink)

Este artigo não pretende analisar o conjunto da obra de Habermas. Trata-se de pensar exclusivamente a Teoria da Ação Comunicativa, primeiro, em relação aos teóricos em que afirma fundamentar-se, depois, no sentido da sua própria articulação lógica interna e, finalmente, em relação ao seu objeto de pesquisa, a realidade social. Procura demonstrar que a TAC executa dois giros conceituais essenciais: um ao limitar o agir estratégico ao espaço da economia e da política e outro ao definir cultura, sociabilidade e subjetividade (...) como dimensões constituídas no mundo da vida. (shrink)

You find yourself in a court of law, accused of having hit someone. What can you do to avoid conviction? You could simply deny the accusation: 'No, I didn't do it'. But suppose you did do it. You may then give a different answer. 'Yes, I hit him', you grant, 'but it was self-defence'; or 'Yes, but I was acting under duress'. To answer in this way-to offer a 'Yes, but...' reply-is to hold that your particular wrong was committed in (...) exceptional circumstances. Perhaps it is true that, as a rule, wrongdoers ought to be convicted. But in your case the court should set the rule aside. You should be acquitted. Within limits, the law allows for exceptions. Or so we tend to think. In fact, the line between rules and exceptions is harder to draw than it seems. How are we to determine what counts as an exception and what as part of the relevant rule? The distinction has important practical implications. But legal theorists have found the notion of an exception surprisingly difficult to explain. This is the longstanding jurisprudential problem that this book seeks to solve. The book is divided into three parts. Part I, Defeasibility in Question, introduces the topic and articulates the core puzzle of defeasibility in law. Part II, Defeasibility in Theory, develops a comprehensive proof-based account of legal exceptions. Part III, Defeasibility in Action, looks more closely into the workings of exceptions in accusatory contexts, including the criminal trial. (shrink)

Forty years after his death, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) remains one of the most discussed and influential legal philosophers of our time. This collection of new essays takes Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law as a stimulus, aiming to move forward the debate on several central issues in contemporary jurisprudence. The essays in Part I address legal validity, the normativity of law, and Kelsen's famous but puzzling idea of a legal system's 'basic norm'. Part II engages with the difficult issues raised by (...) the social realities of law and the actual practices of legal officials. Part III focuses on conceptual features of legal systems and the logical structure of legal norms. All the essays were written for this volume by internationally renowned scholars from seven countries. Also included, in English translation, is an important polemical essay by Kelsen himself. (shrink)

More than 50 years after it was first published, The Concept of Law remains the most important work of legal philosophy in the English-speaking world. In this volume, written for both students and specialists, 13 leading scholars look afresh at Hart's great book. Unique in format, the volume proceeds sequentially through all the main ideas in The Concept of Law: each contributor addresses a single chapter of Hart's book, critically discussing its arguments in light of subsequent developments in the field. (...) Four concluding essays assess the continued relevance for jurisprudence of the 'persistent questions' identified by Hart at the beginning of The Concept of Law. The collection also includes Hart's 'Answers to Eight Questions', written in 1988 and never before published in English. Contributors include Timothy Endicott, Richard HS Tur, Pavlos Eleftheriadis, John Gardner, Grant Lamond, Nicos Stavropoulos, Leslie Green, John Tasioulas, Jeremy Waldron, John Finnis, Frederick Schauer, Pierluigi Chiassoni and Nicola Lacey. (shrink)

This paper discusses the first incarnation of what came to be known as the “Frege-Geach” point. The point was made by Peter Geach in his 1960 essay “Ascriptivism”, and developed in “Assertion”, a 1965 piece. Geach’s articles launch a wholesale attack on theories of non-descriptive performances advanced by “some Oxford philosophers” whom he accuses of ignoring “the distinction between calling a thing ‘P’ and predicating ‘P’ of a thing”. One view that Geach specifically targets is H. L. A. Hart’s claim (...) that sentences of the form “X φ-ed” are not primarily descriptive but ascriptive of responsibility for actions. Hart explicitly accepted Geach’s criticism, and disowned his essay. I argue that he was wrong to do so. Perhaps the essay was worth retracting, but not because of Geach’s objections. I begin by restating and refining Geach’s arguments, in order to bring out the flaw he claimed to have detected in the “pattern of philosophising” that he took Hart’s essay to exemplify. I go on to argue that Geach’s original point poses no obstacle either to non-descriptivism in general, or to Hart’s sui generis non-descriptivist claim in particular. (shrink)

Este artículo es un análisis teórico-reflexivo que tiene como propósito presentar la impor­tancia de la perspectiva cívica científica en la educación filosófica con los niños y niñas. En este marco, se conceptualiza sobre la cultura cívico científica. Luego, se propone reflexionar sobre la necesidad de vincular lo cívico-científico en el ejercicio filosófico en el contexto rural con enfoque territorial.

Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend (...) two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one. (shrink)

The distinction between 'conduct norms' and 'sanction norms' is widely assumed to be an essential tool for any correct understanding of criminal responsibility. Conduct norms (often also called 'primary') are referred to with the language of 'prohibitions', and it is normally accepted that a crime is by definition a 'prohibited' human behaviour, in the sense that it is always an infraction of a 'conduct norm'. I mean to discuss and criticize this rather consensual assumption. Modern criminal codes don't usually incorporate (...) a catalogue of prohibitions, but this is considered to be of no consequence when it comes to discuss whether the law prohibits those behaviours whose performance may lead to the application of a criminal sanction: there is no question that sanction norms may be properly read out of the special parts of our criminal codes, and from a sanction norm it is always possible to infer the correspondent prohibition. Or so the current understanding goes. I shall first try to make some sense of this common idea, which I call the inference thesis. I will then proceed to show why it is wrong. The inference thesis is necessarily committed to an understanding of conduct norms as prescriptive norms addressed to citizens, and the relevant notion of a prescriptive norm has to be characterized in some detail. Having done so, I will argue that such a prescriptive understanding of 'conduct norms' is incompatible with several aspects common to most modern systems of criminal law and unquestionably essential to the concept of a crime. (shrink)

: In this paper we examine two challenges to the orthodox understanding of the fallacy of denying the antecedent. One challenge is to say that passages thought to express the fallacy can usually be given an interpretation on which they express valid arguments, entitling us to query whether the fallacy is commonly, if ever, committed at all. We discuss this claim in Section 1. The second challenge comes from those who think that there are legitimate uses of denying the antecedent (...) that have traditionally been overlooked. In Section 2 we propose a general test for claims of this sort, and assess three versions of this view. (shrink)

In his essay “Pre-Conventions: A Fragment of the Background”, Bruno Celano seems to endorse three claims about what he calls ‘pre-conventions’: that such ‘entities’ exist; that they are neither rules nor de facto regularities; and that their ‘character’ is at once factual and normative: that pre-conventions are “literally, ‘normative facts’.” I suggest that and are not particularly striking claims, and that Celano’s case for is unpersuasive.

Successful accounts of analogy in law have two burdens to discharge. First, they must reflect the fact that the conclusion of an argument by analogy is a normative claim about how to decide a certain case. Second, they must not fail to accord relevance to the fact that the source case was authoritatively decided in a certain way. We argue in the first half of this paper that the common view of the structure of analogical arguments in law cannot overcome (...) these hurdles. In the second half we develop an original account that aims to succeed where others failed. (shrink)

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's account of legal rights is now 100 years old. It has been much discussed, and remains very influential with philosophers and lawyers alike. Yet it is still sometimes misunderstood in crucial respects. This article offers a rigorous exposition of Hohfeld's framework; discusses its claims to comprehensiveness and fundamentality, reviewing recent work on the topic; and highlights the argumentative uses of Hohfeld's most important distinction.

Our paper has three parts. In Part 1, we discuss John Gardner’s thesis that the non-elliptical ascription of agency to law is a necessary and irreducible part of any adequate explanation of the activities of legal officials. We consider three explananda which might conceivably necessitate this ascription, and conclude that none in fact does so. In Part 2, we discuss two other theses of Gardner’s: that it makes no sense to ascribe to law the claim that there are legal obligations (...) , and that law’s claim is the claim that there are moral obligations . We take issue with Gardner’s arguments for , and suggest that is unwarranted in the absence of an argument that law makes any claims at all. In Part 3, we briefly argue that, insofar as it issues requirements, there are certain claims that law cannot but make. We conclude that if Gardner is right that law’s claims are those of certain of its officials, it is law-making and not law-applying officials who make law’s claim. (shrink)

The contemporaneous ecological concern constitutes a tread line issue; the distance from superficial activist actions, although, as well as the credible philosophical - phenomenological - background that support the request for the stem cause, distinguishes and outstands Abram ‘s reflection. His poetic and prophetically discourse calls upon the need for a extremely disavowal reorganisation of the position of Man and his task within the cosmos.

Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend (...) two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one. (shrink)

Most philosophers of criminal law agree that between criminal offences and defences there is a significant, substantial difference. It is a difference, however, that has proved hard to pin down. In recent work, Duff and others have suggested that it mirrors the distinction between criminal answerability and liability to criminal punishment. Offence definitions, says Duff, are—and ought to be—those action-types ‘for which a defendant can properly be called to answer in a criminal court, on pain of conviction and condemnation if (...) she cannot offer an exculpatory answer’; and defences are ‘exculpatory answers’ that ‘block the transition from responsibility to liability’. I criticise this answerability-based account of the offence/defence divide. It is descriptively false, I claim, as well as normatively unappealing. (shrink)

I propose and defend a proof-based account of legal exceptions. The basic thought is that the characteristic behaviour of exceptions is to be explained in terms of the distinction, relative to some given decision-type C in some decision-making context, between two classes of relevant facts: those that may, and those that may not, remain uncertain if a token decision C is to count as correctly made. The former is the class of exceptions. A fact F is an exception relative to (...) some decision-type C, I claim, if (i) the ascertainment of F is sufficient for a token decision C not to count as correctly made, and (ii) the ascertainment of the negation of F is not necessary for a token decision C to count as correctly made. I also recuperate, reconstruct and discuss some of HLA Hart’s early views on defeasible judicial decisions. These two projects are closely connected: the latter is a vehicle for the former. (shrink)

This short paper addresses a well‐known difficulty in the Pure Theory of Law: the definition of a legal wrong. Kelsen was unable to offer a suitable one, critics say. I agree. But the critics misdiagnosed the problem, and prescribed for it a fruitless solution. The reason for Kelsen’s failure, the critics say, was that he thought the law consists only of sanction‐stipulating norms addressed to officials, and does not comprise duty‐imposing norms addressed to citizens. But the critics are wrong, exegetically (...) as well as substantively. Kelsen did not—and indeed could not—deny that there are such duty‐imposing norms; and it is not the case, in any event, that the admission that there are such norms would enable us to explain the notion of a legal wrong. Kelsen failed to provide an adequate characterization of the notion of a legal wrong, yes, but for a different reason. (shrink)

O conhecimento tem sido objeto de reflexão e estudo em várias áreas do saber, bem como elemento-chave nas grandes transformações enfrentadas pela humanidade. Assim, a autorreflexão, conforme aponta Jürgen Habermas refere-se a um processo de análise crítica e autorreflexiva realizado por indivíduos e pela sociedade como um todo. A autorreflexão também está associada ao desenvolvimento do entendimento crítico, o que permite que os sujeitos, de modo coletivo avaliem constantemente suas próprias ações e instituições em relação aos padrões de justiça, igualdade (...) e compensação. Em termos mais amplos, a autorreflexão em Habermas está relacionada ao conceito de “espaço público” e à ideia de que uma sociedade saudável e democrática requer um diálogo público aberto e crítico, o que fundamenta a pesquisa-ação. Encontramos na pesquisa-ação uma abordagem que combina a investigação acadêmica com a ação prática para promover mudanças sociais, envolvendo a colaboração entre pesquisadores e membros da comunidade, visando gerar conhecimento relevante e aplicável às questões enfrentadas por estas. Perante o exposto, toma-se como objetivo principal tecer considerações acerca do conceito de autorreflexão para estratégia de produção de dados numa pesquisa-ação crítica. Trata-se de um relato de pesquisa que visa refletir acerca da autorreflexão incorporada na metodologia da pesquisa-ação, principalmente no tocante à formação continuada de profissionais da educação. Nesse contexto, acredita-se que, a partir da autorreflexão crítica tais profissionais possam constituir-se em uma comunidade autocrítica de pesquisadores que investigam suas concepções e ações, possibilitando outros/novos modos de conceber e produzir conhecimentos. (shrink)

Cacao cultivation is one of the most important livelihoods for rural households in Colombia, where it is promoted as a substitute for the illegal cultivation of coca. To strengthen Colombian cacao farming, it is important to understand the livelihood strategies associated with cacao cultivation and the impact of these different strategies on the well-being of Colombian rural households. We analyzed the impact of cacao cultivation on the livelihood strategies and well-being of rural households in western Colombia. Research with 92 rural (...) cacao-growing households produced a typology of household livelihood strategies derived from their approach to cacao production. Indicators of each household capital and level of well-being were identified for each type of households. Correlations between the capitals and the capitals of greater importance in shaping the well-being of rural households were analyzed. Three types of rural households were identified: Cacao Farmers, Diversified Farmers with Cacao, and New Cacao Farmers. Cacao farmers have the highest capitals endowments and level of well-being, followed by Diversified Farmers with Cacao, and New Cacao Farmers. The conditions of cacao cultivation in rural households result in differentiated access to resources from capitals; households with better development of the crop have consolidated greater well-being where human capital has been its major driving factor. Success of the cacao crop and its relationship with well-being of rural households depends on the convergence of different capital resources. Thus, institutional efforts to strengthen the cacao sector in Colombia must go beyond investment to establish new hectares and consider aspects such as: Strengthening the skills and knowledge of producers to improve crop management practices, Promoting the participation of household members in associations, Stimulating sensitivity to the rooting and sustainable management of the crop, and Promoting processes of technification and adaptation of the infrastructure of fermenters and dryers, which will make it possible to guarantee an adequate quality of the cacao bean. (shrink)

Nos livros impressos, nem sempre as imagens estão de acordo com os textos que deveriam ilus­trar. Neste artigo, o autor analisa algumas estampas xilográficas que estão em desacordo com os textos que 'ilustram', em O Flos Sanctorum em linguagem português, impresso em Lisboa, por Hermão de Campos & Roberto Rabelo, em 1513.

Toma-se como objetivo tecer considerações acerca do conceito de autorreflexão e emancipação, entrelaçando-o à pesquisa-ação, por meio do diálogo entre Jürgen Habermas, Theodor W. Adorno, Wilfred Carr e Stephen Kemmis. Os conceitos de autorreflexão e emancipação surgem na Escola de Frankfurt através de Adorno e são incorporados por Habermas, que dá outro sentido a eles. Carr e Kemmis, ao refletirem sobre a pesquisa-ação emancipatória na educação, tomam Habermas como alicerce e constituem o conceito de autorreflexão crítica. A partir das considerações (...) dos autores, o artigo reflete acerca da autorreflexão incorporada na metodologia da pesquisa-ação, principalmente no tocante à formação continuada de profissionais da educação. À luz dos pressupostos habermasianos, defendem-se os conceitos de autorreflexão e emancipação pela via da ação comunicativa, na qual o paradigma da consciência é transposto para o paradigma da linguagem. Compreende-se que para Adorno a autorreflexão está atrelada diretamente à liberdade, ao pensamento crítico e à autonomia, que guiam o indivíduo para a emancipação. Enquanto para Habermas, a autorreflexão vincula-se à linguagem e à comunicação, entre dois ou mais sujeitos, que os guiam para a emancipação. Carr e Kemmis inspirados na espiral cíclica proposta por Lewin e na autorreflexão de Habermas, vão defender a espiral autorreflexiva na pesquisa-ação. Diante disso, entende-se que os problemas da educação têm na racionalidade comunicativa perspectivas de mudanças sólidas, especialmente pela via de processos formativos. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, investigamos relações que autores psicanalíticos fazem entre histeria e literatura. Fizemos um estudo dos artigos destes autores, e o objetivo foi de expor as temáticas abordadas por eles quando reúnem e interpretam juntas histeria, psicanálise e literatura. Historicamente, tanto a h..